Federal Reserve : Ready to lend : the discount window's evolving role as a liquidity lifeline for depository institutions by Charles Gerena
I
n the past, people visited their
friendly neighborhood banker to
borrow money for a new house. Now,
consumers can get mortgages online.
In the early days of the Federal
Reserve System, bankers visited the
friendly neighborhood discount window
to borrow reserves when there was a
run on deposits or an unexpected rise
in loan volume. They brought their col-
lateral to a teller window at a Federal
Reserve Bank.
The window doesn’t operate from
the lobby of the Richmond Fed’s down-
town office anymore. It occupies a
corner of the 18th floor, where the men
and women of the Loans Department
work the phones and computers to help
depository institutions establish lending
agreements and pledge collateral.
The department’s most significant
activity isn’t processing loans, though.
“We make a handful of loans a month
on average, but we have to be prepared
to lend to hundreds of institutions,”
says Senior Manager Gregory Robin-
son. “We have to constantly monitor
the collateral that would secure those
loans if institutions come to us.”
Borrowers also don’t have to physi-
cally take their collateral to the Fed.
They can pledge assets, such as a port-
folio of consumer or commercial loans,
and maintain possession of them.
Amid these and other changes, the
mission of the discount window remains
— to relieve liquidity strains on indi-
vidual institutions and the banking
system as a whole. Over the years, the
Fed has tried to balance the window’s
role in keeping financial markets stable
against the need to curtail lending that
may unintentionally support financially
troubled institutions.
The latest attempt to address this
issue was in January, when the Fed reor-
ganized the window’s operations. To
understand the significance of these
changes, however, they must be viewed
against the backdrop of the discount
window’s continuing evolution.
When the Federal Reserve System
was created in 1913, the discount window
was its primary instrument of monetary
policy. By affecting the amount of
reserves held by banks, the Fed could
influence the amount of money and
credit available in the U.S. economy. 
The window provides reserves
through two vehicles — discounts and
advances. With the former, a bank pro-
vides the Fed with an asset like a short-
term business loan. In return, it
receives credit equal to the asset’s value
at maturity minus a “discount” based
on the discount rate, which is the inter-
est charged on the loan. When the
asset matures, the Fed returns it to the
bank and receives a cash payment equal
to the maturity value. 
An advance is much simpler than a
discount. A bank pays interest at the
discount rate to receive a loan from the
Fed against acceptable collateral. Cur-
rently, the window supplies all of its
reserves in the form of advances.
Each of the Federal Reserve’s 12
banks could change the discount rate
in response to economic conditions in
its district. When the supply of money
and credit tightened, it lowered the
rate and made it easier for banks to
increase their reserves. When there
was too much money, it made it harder
for banks to boost reserves. (Today, dis-
count rates across the Federal Reserve
System are normally in sync.)
The discount window remained the
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SFederal Reserve’s dominant monetary
policy tool until the effectiveness of
Open Market operations emerged in
the 1920s. Through this tool, the Fed
buys government securities to pump
money into the financial markets, or
sells securities to absorb money. Open
Market operations are effective only
when financial markets are broad and
deep, and America’s markets had
reached that point.
George Kaufman, director of the
Center for Financial and Policy
Studies at Loyola University, Chicago,
points out several advantages of Open
Market operations. “It reduces the
political pressures on [the Fed] to
assist all entities in financial distress,
in particular, financially weak but
politically strong entities,” he wrote
in a November 1999 paper. “The
private market is less likely to direct
additional funds … to such entities.” 
Also, “efficient markets price funds
provided through Open Market opera-
tions at the current market rate for the
particular risks involved. In contrast,
funds provided through the discount
window are priced administratively and,
if priced incorrectly, may both misallo-
cate resources and reduce the effec-
tiveness of the assistance.”
As Open Market operations took
center stage at the Fed, the discount
window stepped into the sidelines in
subsequent decades. According to econ-
omist Allan Meltzer at Carnegie Mellon
University, the Fed discouraged banks
from window borrowing. “They took
the position that borrowing was a priv-
ilege, not a right,” explains Meltzer, who
recently wrote a historical account of
the Federal Reserve from 1913 to 1951.
“In the early days, they would do it by
restricting the kind of collateral that
they would take. Later…they would talk
to banks about [the potential problems
of] continuous borrowing.”
Staff at the discount window
explained that credit was intended only
to meet unexpected shortfalls in
reserves on a limited basis. Also, Federal
Reserve regulations required borrowers
to exhaust all other sources of credit
before coming to the window. Adepos-
itory institution wasn’t supposed to
borrow from the window to boost its
normal lending capacity, or to exploit
the spread between the discount rate
and the federal funds rate, which is the
interest that institutions charge to
borrow reserves from each other.
At the same time, alternative sources
of credit expanded like the federal funds
market, which Meltzer believes is more
efficient than window borrowing
because reserves flow to where they are
most needed. Bankers also learned to
manage their reserves better.
Window volume spiked during the
1980s when reserves flowed to troubled
savings and loans, but it has generally
remained low as the discount window
began to be regarded as “a lender of last
resort.” Institutions have obtained
credit from other sources, including the
federal funds market, the nationwide
Federal Home Loan Bank System, and
larger institutions with which they have
a correspondent relationship.
A
ccording to the team at the
Richmond Fed’s discount window,
large complex banking organi-
zations in the Fifth District don’t frequent
the window very often. “But when they
come, they usually have a big need,” notes
Robinson. “Something has happened in
the financial markets, and they can’t get
the funds that they need.” 
A prominent example was Sept. 12,
2001, the day after terrorists struck the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
Loan volume reached $45 billion that
day. But there have been other
instances when large banks have
employed the window. For example,
The Bank of New York got a $23 billion
loan in 1985 when a computer glitch
interrupted its transaction processing. 
Regional and community banks
usually borrow small amounts of
reserves periodically for less dramatic
reasons, says Rebecca Snider, assistant
vice president of the Loans Depart-
ment. It can be late in the afternoon
and a bank official realizes that reserves
are running short due to human error
or an operational problem. 
But, smaller institutions visit the
discount window more often than
larger ones because they have fewer
funding sources with earlier cutoff
times for filing requests, notes Nita
Tinsley, one of the department’s senior
analysts. “We are here ’til the cows
come home, or a half hour afterwards.”
(The window stays open 30 minutes
after the close of Fedwire, which trans-
fers funds between depository institu-
tions until 6:30 p.m.)
Bad weather also accounts for some
window borrowing by smaller institu-
tions. Tinsley says that even when bank
employees can’t make it to work, trans-
actions still post to the institution’s
reserve account. “Bankers don’t know
what their balance is, so they’ll call to
get the balance and borrow to cover
whatever is needed.” 
Seasonal changes don’t drive smaller
borrowers to the Fifth District’s dis-
count window as they do elsewhere.
Normally, seasonal credit flows from
the window into agricultural commu-
nities because farmers withdraw funds
and request loans at the beginning of
every growing season to plant crops.
This can drain a bank’s deposits and
increase loan volume, explains Robin-
son. But agriculture is more prominent
in other regions like the Midwest.
Whether it’s a snowstorm or a
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SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
Who Knocks at the Window?
About 460 of the Fifth District’s 1,300 depository
institutions have lending agreements with the
discount window. The other 11 Federal Reserve
Districts combined have about the same ratio of
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blackout, depository institutions of all
sizes never know when a sudden short-
fall in reserves will occur and credit
won’t be available. That’s why Snider
thinks they should establish access to
the discount window before something
happens. Lending agreements have
been executed in just a few days during
emergencies, but it is generally “not a
quick process.”
A
s of January, more than three-
quarters of the Fifth District’s 422
commercial banks had lending
agreements with the window. But less than
half of the region’s 96 savings banks and
only 11 percent of its 764 credit unions
have such agreements (see graph on p. 3).
This brings us back to an important
question—why don’t more institutions
use the window? One reason has been
the stigma associated with window bor-
rowing. No one is supposed to know
about the transaction beyond the parties
involved. However, examiners from
various regulatory agencies, including
the Fed, periodically review all of the
loans on a bank’s balance sheet. There-
fore, bank officials have hesitated about
using the window too often because it
might serve as a red flag.
Also, the banking industry can often
tell when someone borrows from the
window, which can raise questions about
the institution’s financial strength. “If a
large institution is in the marketplace
looking for a large volume of money and
all of a sudden it drops out, there is an
assumption that it went to the window,
especially if within that district there
was a large amount of borrowing
reported for that week,” says Snider.
Another reason why depository
institutions have been reluctant to
borrow from the discount window is
the time and effort involved with the
application process. Also, it may take
time for window staff to assess the bor-
rower’s collateral. Some forms of col-
lateral are straightforward to evaluate,
such as U.S. Treasury and agency secu-
rities, and investment-grade debt issued
by state and local governments. But
consumer and commercial loans can
take longer to review, as well as new
types of securities that the Richmond
Fed hasn’t dealt with before.
L
ast October, the Federal Reserve’s
Board of Governors approved
changes to address the issues that
have been blamed for discouraging
appropriate use of the discount window.
These changes went into effect Jan. 9.
The Fed eliminated the window’s
adjustment credit and extended credit
programs. The former loaned reserves
on a short-term basis while the latter pro-
vided loans over a longer time period,
but only under exceptional circum-
stances. (The seasonal credit program
wasn’t changed.)
Two new programs have taken their
place. Primary credit is extended for
very short terms like adjustment
credit, but Federal Reserve Banks must
charge a discount rate that is above the
federal funds rate. Secondary credit for
banks that don’t qualify for primary
credit must be priced even higher. (In
January, the discount rate for primary
credit was 100 basis points above the
Fed’s target for the federal funds rate,
while the rate for secondary credit was
50 basis points higher than primary
credit.) Previously, adjustment credit
was priced at the discount rate, which
has been consistently lower than the
federal funds rate since 1990.
Pricing window credit above the
market rate is intended to create an
economic disincentive for excessive
borrowing, which is how many central
banks operate their discount windows.
This will substitute for what George
Kaufman calls the Fed’s “gentle per-
suasion” and scrutiny of borrowers.
Fewer questions, if any, will be asked
when a borrower comes to the discount
window. Any financially sound institu-
tion can obtain credit for any purpose.
Also, borrowers are not required to
exhaust all market sources before uti-
lizing the window.
The Board of Governors also
approved these changes to address the
perception that banks resort to window
borrowing only when they are in finan-
cial trouble. Plus, it wanted to make
borrowing administratively easier.
In 1980, Congress allowed depository
institutions that weren’t members of the
Federal Reserve System to borrow from
the window. But in 1991, in the aftermath
of the 1980s S&L crisis, lawmakers
restricted borrowing by banks that didn’t
meet minimum capital requirements.
“Discount window borrowing was pro-
viding capital for banks that were basi-
cally insolvent,” notes economist Anna
Schwartz of the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research. “That was not what the
Federal Reserve Act of 1913 intended the
window to be used for.”
What will be the role of the dis-
count window in the future? Most
economists agree that the financial
markets need a back-up source of liq-
uidity during emergencies. However,
others argue that the window has little
value as a monetary policy tool as long
as the Fed can use Open Market oper-
ations to influence the supply of money
and credit.
Of course, that could change if the
federal government stops its deficit
spending and resumes generating sur-
pluses. “If we ever ran a series of sur-
pluses and reduced the amount of
government debt,” says Allan Meltzer,
this might leave fewer government secu-
rities for the Fed to buy and sell in its
Open Market operations. “There would
have to be another mechanism.” RF
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